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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
GARLEN E. DOUGLAS,

\

Plaintiff and

Respondent,~

vs.
Case No.
8876
Defendant and Appellant, (

JACK I. GIGANDET,

\~

and
MRS. PHYLLIS GIGANDET,

I

Intervenor and Appellant.!

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
To more accurately state the facts, as set forth by the
appellants in their brief, and to supplement the same, the
respondent is compelled to make some repetition in the following statement.
On the morning of June 22, 1956, at about 8:00 o'clock
the plaintiff and respondent herein, Garlen E. Douglas, left
3
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his home in Monticello, Utah, and proceeded north on U. S.
Highway No. 160, intending to travel to where this highway
intersected with another public roadway known as the Peters
Point road, located about seven miles north of Monticello
(Tr. 4, 5, 6, 34, 35 & 36). Douglas was driving his 1954
Willys Pickup truck, in which he was riding alone, and had
his horse in the rear rack of the vehicle (Tr. 22 & 23). The
weather was clear, the sun was shining, and visibility was good
(Tr. 4, 20 & 51).
When Douglas reached a point between 100 and 150
feet South of the Peters Point road, he turned on the left
blinker light on his truck, thereby indicating his intention to
turn left at the intersection of these two roadways (Tr. 11, 14,
15, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 47 & 87). This intersection is located
on a curve and on a hill, sloping in the direction in which Douglas was traveling (Tr. 18, 51 & 63, Exhibits C & 3). At this
time, Douglas looked in his rear view mirror, but saw no
traffic behind him (Tr. 25). He just started to turn the front
wheels on his vehicle to the left when he was struck from the
rear by a 1952 Dodge Sedan vehicle, owned and being driven
by Jack I. Gigandet (Tr. 26 & 65). Mrs. Phyllis Gigandet,
intervenor and also appellant herein, was riding in the front
seat with her husband at the time of the collision (Tr. 51 &
74).
Jack Gigandet testified he was traveling north on Highway 160 and just before the accident, he came around the
aforementioned curve and at that time saw the Douglas truck
about 200 feet ahead, also traveling north, that it was in the
lane for northbound traffic, and was below him on down the
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hill at that place (Tr. 52, 63 & 83). Gigandet further testified that he continued his speed of 50 to 55 miles per hour,
apparently didn't sound his horn, and when within about three
car lengths of the Douglas truck, he began turning into the
southbound lane, intending to pass the truck (Tr. 52, 63,
64, 82, 84) . That at about the time Gigandet started to turn
out to pass, the Douglas truck commenced a left turn into
the Peters Point road, which road Gigandet says was not
observed by him prior to the accident, and Gigandet then
applied his brakes and attempted to avoid the collision (Tr.
52, 53, 63, 84 & 85). The front of the Gigandet sedan
collided with the rear of the Douglas truck, causing the latter
vehicle to leave the west side of the two-lane highway, overturn, and come to rest on its right side, 74 feet northwest
from the point of impact (Tr. 2, 9, 13, 15, 26, 29, 53 & 75
-Exhibits 2 & D). The impact was so severe that it knocked
the horse backward from the truck and the horse fell on to
the hood and windshield of the Gigandet sedan (Tr. 65 &
66).
The investigating police officers established the hard
surface of Highway 160 to be 26 feet wide, having one lane
of traffic for each direction of travel, with a 2 foot shoulder
on each side of the roadway (Tr. 10, 11, 12 & 21). The
Gigandet sedan layed down 59 feet of solid black skid marks
prior to impact and 36Vz feet from the point of impact to
where it came to stop in the lane for northbound traffic (Tr.
8, 20, 21).
There was apparently a stop sign located on the
southwest corner of the intersection for control of traffic
5
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entering Highway 160 from the Peters Point road (Tr. 6, 17
& 18). The impact point was established as being in the lane
for northbound traffic and close to the intersection of the
two roadways (Tr. 9, 26). The severity of the impact is
further attested by the damages done to the Gigandet sedan
and the Douglas truck (Tr. 29, 30 & 67-Plaintiff's Exhibit
"D" and Defendant's Exhibit "2"), and the further fact
that Douglas had the truck brakes on, that it was in low gear,
a.nd that the truck traveled a distance of 74 feet before coming
to rest on its right side (Tr. 9, 26, 36 & 37). Prior to the
collision, the Douglas truck was equipped on the rear with
two turn signal lights, with red reflectors, circular in shape
and about 5 inches in diameter (Tr. 31, 32, 37, 38 & 39).
The truck also had two stop lights on the rear end, each
respectively located just below the two turn lights (Tr. 31
& 32).
Before the happening of this accident, the appellants
were on a vacation trip from their home in Toledo, Ohio
(Tr. 50 & 62). After touring some of the West, they intended
to return via the Southern route, U. S. Highway 66, and visit
Mrs. Gigandet's grandmother in Sioux Springs, Texas, on the
way home (Tr. 62 & 63). Mrs. Gigandet was to alternate in
driving with her husband on the trip and was assisting him
in the driving of the vehicle by keeping a lookout and bringing
to his attention other traffic on the roadway (Tr. 82). She
had driven the car during the trip and prior to the accident
(Tr. 82, 83 & 85).
From the foregoing evidence, in which there was sharp
conflict, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant,
6
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Jack I. Gigandet, and against the plaintiff, no cause of action,
on the plaintiff's complaint; a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and against the said defendant of no cause of action on
defendant's counterclaim; and a verdict in favor of the plaintiff of no cause of action on the cross-complaint of Phyllis
Gigandet (Tr. 104 & 105). It is from this verdict and judgment of the trial court entered thereon, that appellants Jack
I. Gigandet and Phyllis Gigandet take this appeal ( R. 113) .
The appellants set forth in their brief five separate points
upon which they claim reliance for a reversal of this case but
we agree with them in their statement that there are only
two basic questions for consideration by this Court. Accordingly, we shall consider them in the two statement of points
hereinafter set forth.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3, THEREBY SUBMITTING
TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT
THE DEFENDANT JACK I. GIGANDET WAS GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN THE OPERATION OF HIS AUTOMOBILE AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT.
1.

2. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5, THEREBY SUBMITTING
TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT JACK
I. GIGANDET, IF ANY, COULD BE IMPUTED TO HIS
7
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WIFE, PHYLLIS GIGANDET, WHO WAS RIDING WITH
HIM IN HIS CAR.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3, THEREBY.SUBMITTING
TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT
THE DEFENDANT JACK I. GIGANDET WAS GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN THE OPERATION OF HIS AUTOMOBILE AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT.
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to how and
why this accident occurred. The appellants apparently can
give no explanation for the collision except to say that an
emergency situation was presented, as to them, by the acts and
conduct of the plaintiff. In their brief, counsel for appellants
quote at length their testimony to the effect that neither of
them saw any signal given by the plaintiff that he intended
to make a left turn at the intersection of Highway 160 and
the Peters Point road, nor did they observe the brake lights
on his truck prior to the collision. In further support of the
contention that plaintiff had not signalled, appellants quote
from his testimony on page 47 in the transcript to the effect
that in a statement given by the plaintiff a couple of days
following the accident, that plaintiff thought he had turned
his left signal blinker for a left turn about 100 to 150 feet
to the south of the aforementioned intersection and that although he did not know for sure, he always did turn on his
8
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lights and assumed he did at that time. In contrast to this
evidence, we have the testimony of plaintiff to the effect
that he had signalled his intention to turn, had applied his
brakes and shifted his truck into low gear before coming
to the intersection, and that he looked in his rear view mirror
before any turn was made (Tr. 25, 26 & 27). The fact that
plaintiff had signalled is corroborated by the two investigating officers' testimony that the signal arm on the inside
of the cab of plaintiff's truck was in a left hand turn position
immediately following the accident (Tr. 14, 15 & 20).
We now invite this Court's attention to what the appellant
Jack I. Gigandet did or failed to do in the operation of his
automobile which had some bearing upon the happening of
this accident. He continued to travel at a speed of 50 to
55 miles per hour, on a curve, and going down hill to the
place where he came into close proximity with respondent's
truck (Tr. 63, 64 & 82). Even though the highway was relatively narrow and he saw the truck some 200 feet ahead of
him at the time he came over the crest of the hill and around
this curve, appellant Gigandet failed to slow his vehicle or
even sound the horn so as to warn the respondent that he
was about to pass (Tr. 51, 52 & 82). He also failed to see
the intersecting Peters Point road, even though he was considerably higher than the level of the intersection, and apparently was not observing plaintiff's truck, because he did
not see either the left blinker light flashing or notice the two
brake lights which must have been on because respondent
testified his brakes were applied before any impact, and that
his truck left skid marks from the northbound lane to the
westerly edge of the highway, after being struck from the
9
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rear by the Gigandet vehicle (Tr. 36, 37, 63 & 67-Exhibits
B, C & 3).
It is our contention that from the foregoing facts in evidence, the trial court was required to submit the issues of
the negligence of appellant Jack I. .Gigandet to the jury as
was done in its Instruction Number 3. In their brief, appellants
apparently confuse this instruction by saying the court was
then instructing the jury on contributory negligence, but as
the record will show (R. 81 & 82), the trial court was merely
setting forth the circumstances by which the appellant, Jack
I. Gigandet, could be found guilty of negligence if the jury
concluded that he had violated any duty owed the plaintiff
in the respects therein set forth. It should be noted that appellants ommitted from their quotation of Instruction Number 3
the last paragraph thereof, and wherein the trial court further
instructed the jury that even though they found the defendant
Jack I. Gigandet guilty of negligence and that such negligence
was a proximate cause of the collision, they could not find a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff if at the same time they found
the plaintiff was guilty of any negligence which proximately
contributed to the cause of the collision. We see nothing wrong
in this instruction based upon the evidence adduced at the
trial. It clearly defined to the jury the circumstances under
which they would be justified in finding the appellant Jack I.
Gigandet guilty of negligence which proximately caused or
proximately contributed to the happening of the accident.
On the other hand, we fail to follow the reasoning of counsel
for appellants wherein they urge in their brief that this instruction placed a higher degree of duty upon the appellant,
Jack I. Gigandet, than was justified under the conditions.
10
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All of the evidence in the case is contrary to their contention,
now urged for the first time, that the Peters Point road was
a private road or driveway and not within the purview of
Section 41-6-7 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defining a
"street or highway" as:
"The entire width between the boundary lines of
every way publicly maintained when any part thereof
is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel."
There is no evidence in the record that the Peters Point road
was other than a public roadway and it was certainly not a
"private road or driveway" as defined in subsection (b) of the
aforementioned statute, and as contended in appellants' brief.
The evidence was to the effect that it had a wide graveled
shoulder where it intersected with Highway 160 and that a
stop sign was placed so as to control traffic entering the main
highway from the west (Tr. 12, 13 & 17-Exhibit 3). With
this evidence before it, the trial court properly submitted this
issue to the jury as one of the elements of fact for determination
in view of Section 41-6-58 (a) (2), Utah Code Annotated,
195 3, which prohibits the driving of a vehicle to the left
side of the roadway when approaching within 100 feet of or
traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing. We fail
to see wherein Section 41-6-59, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
has any application to the facts of this case and accordingly
cannot agree with appellants wherein they contend that as
a prerequisite to the giving of this Instruction Number 3, the
evidence should either show that the intersection in question
was plainly marked with appropriate signs or that it was
such that a reasonable and prudent driver using due care
1l
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could have seen it. There are numerous public roads throughout Utah which are not posted to warn travelers of an intersection ahead and certainly any number of them are obscured
from observation by trees, foliage, peculiarity of construction,
or for some other reason cannot be readily seen without keeping a reasonable and proper lookout. It is thus our position
that the question of lookout on the part of Jack I. Gigandet
and whether by reason of inattention he failed to see the
intersection where Peters Point road entered Highway 160,
were questions for the jury to determine from all of the facts
and circumstances. The evidence indicated this was a rear
end collision, wherein appellant's vehicle struck the rear end
of respondent's truck while the latter was slowing down to
make a turn, and while we were surprised that the jury found
contributory negligence on the part of respondent, nevertheless, that finding seems conclusive.
It is elementary that matters of negligence, contributory

negligence and proximate cause generally are jury questions,
unless evidentiary facts are of such conclusive character as
to require all reasonable minds to conclude that ultimate
fact of negligence, contributory negligence or proximate cause
does or does not exist.
See: lOA and lOB Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm. Ed., Sections 6594,
6600 and 6618.
This Court is committed to that principle in numerous
cases, a few of which are:
Earle vs. Salt Lake & Utah Ry. Corp., 109 Utah
111, 165 P. 2d 877.
12
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Hayden vs. Ceclerlund, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P. 2d 796.
Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 122 Utah 312, 249 P. 2d 213,
on rehearing 259 P. 2d 294.
Jensen vs. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P. 2d 838.
Applying the foregoing principles to our instant case,
we respectfully submit that the trial court did not err in submitting the foregoing questions to the jury for its determination under adequate and proper instructions.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5, THEREBY SUBMITTING
TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT JACK
I. GIGANDET, IF ANY, COULD BE IMPUTED TO HIS
WIFE, PHYLLIS GIGANDET, WHO WAS RIDING WITH
HIM IN HIS CAR.
/

It is our contention that the trial court properly submitted
to the jury the issue of whether the contributory negligence
of Jack I. Gigandet, if any, could be imputed to appellant,
Phyllis Gigandet, and we do not agree with appellants' view
that the lower court erred in giving Instruction Number 5
to the jury, and in refusing to give their requested instructions
3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

We respectfully submit that the evidence adduced relating to imputed negligence created a question for the jury
to be resolved by it from all of the facts and circumstances.
13
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The appellants each testified that they were on a vacation
trip for their mutual enjoyment (Tr. 51, 62, 82 & 83). Phyllis
Gigandet had driven a car for some 12 years (Tr. 75) and
had been alternating in the driving of the vehcile on this
trip (Tr. 51, 62, 82, 83 & 85). Mrs. Gigandet further testified
that she had been assisting her husband in the driving of the
car by keeping a lookout ahead and bringing to his attention
things that may have been on the roadway during the time
he was driving (Tr. 82). She also testified that they were
going to ·visit her grandmother in Texas on the return tour
home and that was one of the purposes of the trip and was
for their mutual benefit (Tr. 62 & 83). Just before the accident,
Mrs. Gigandet saw respondent's truck moving slowly on the
highway ahead but failed to warn her husband until just
before the impact with the rear of it (Tr. 84). This fact is
further established by Jack Gigandet's testimony that his speed
of 50 to 55 miles per hour at impact was about the same as
at the time he first saw respondent's truck (Tr. 57 & 63).
Thus the foregoing facts demonstrate that Mrs. Gigandet
at least had to some degree a right of control over the vehicle
her husband was driving, even though the title to the car was
registerd in his name, and he was actually driving at the time
of the collision. We disagree wtih counsel for appellants when
he says that the fact that a husband and wife are on a vacation
trip together does not make it a "common purpose" because
we can conceive of no reason for them being together in such
a situation other than for a community of purpose with a
common destination. By the giving of Instruction Number 5,
the trial court properly submitted this issue of joint venture
to the jury for determination from the facts adduced to show
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right of control in the operation of the vehicle by Mrs. Gigandet. In this instruction, the trial court said in part:
"In order to find that they were engaged in a JOlnt
venture, you must find from a preponderance of the
evidence that they were in joint or common possession
and operation of the automobile in pursuance of such
purpose with both having rights to be heard in its
control and management. If you find such to be a
fact, then they are both responsible for the operation
of the automobile and the contributory negligence, if
any, of the defendant is imputed to the cross-complainant, his wife,a nd she cannot recover."
The trial court then went on to state in said instruction
that there was no presumption raised that they were engaged
in a joint enterprise by the fact that they were husband and
wife, nor did the fact that Mrs. Gigandet was not at the wheel
of the automobile at the time of the collision, standing alone,
preclude a finding that she and her husband were engaged
in a joint venture of the kind that makes his negligence imputable to her (R. 85).
This Court has considered this proposition m a wellreasoned opinion by Mr. Justice Wolfe in the case of Fox vs.
Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 59 P. 2d 1049, which involved an
action brought against a wife riding in a vehicle owned by the
husband and wife for injuries arising out of an accident which
occurred while the automobile was being driven by the husband
on an errand for the wife. Even under those facts, this Court
held that the question of whether or not the wife was responsible for her husband's negligence was for the jury and that
any presumption created by vanous factual relationships be15
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tween the parties in any of a number of given situations are
presumptions rebuttable by evidence.
This doctrine has been since affirmed in Ida M. Johnson;
Adm'x. vs. Arthur Hardman, et al, 6 Utah 2d 421, 315 P.
2d 854.
Since the verdict of the jury on this proposition of imputed negligence was supported by substantial evidence, resolving the disputed issues in favor of the respondent and against
the appellant, Phyllis Gigandet, that judgment should not be
disturbed.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not err
in its instructions to the jury, nor in refusing to give certain
requested instructions of the appellants, and that the verdict
and judgment appealed frorr should not be disturbed.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD, BAYLE & HURD and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
Attorneys for Respondent

1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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